![referensi levinson pragmatics referensi levinson pragmatics](https://s3.studylib.net/store/data/008309850_1-3d187749a7824dde67140bc9b18b8dc1-768x994.png)
Within the Gricean pragmatic tradition, a sharp line is drawn between decoding and inference, and the temporal and causal connotations of (1) and (2) are seen as purely inferential. In the recent linguistic literature, these problems have been approached from two rather different perspectives. Why does the hearer often take the events to stand in a causal or consequential relation, so that in (1b), for example, he would assume that the glass broke because it was dropped? Why does the hearer generally take the events described to be separated by different intervals, so that in (1b), for example, he would assume that the glass broke as soon as it was dropped, whereas in (1c) he would not expect the acorn to have sprouted as soon as it touched the ground? Why does the hearer generally take the events to have happened in a certain order, so that in (1d), for example, he would assume that Peter left before Mary got angry? We will look in particular at the following problems:
![referensi levinson pragmatics referensi levinson pragmatics](https://i1.rgstatic.net/publication/280216035_A_contextual_perspective_on_presupposition_with_reference_to_translation_studies/links/56429f1108ae997866c4c334/largepreview.png)
This paper is concerned with how they arise. Such relations are not encoded in the meanings of the sentences uttered. In interpreting utterances such as (1) and (2), the hearer generally treats the events described as temporally or causally related: We sketch an inferential account of unencoded causal and temporal components of utterance interpretation as in: “John dropped the glass and it broke.”